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NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE
established. It is no respector of a certainty of error, and true social
advances have hothing to fear from it.
If accepted, the principles of the Natural Law may cleanse from
our Jurisprudence the concepts of positivism which seem to have crept
in over the years, and which well might have destroyed the basis of
our constitutional processes. Likewise, these ideas will have little com-
fort for the legal tortoises who seek, as has been said, to use the Nat-
ural Law as a sanction for the dead hand of perpetual legal status quo.
They will on the other hand encourage those who, while they feel the
need for social advance, are fearful that methods which savor of
positivism, pragmatism, and materialism will in the end destroy the
safeguards which protect our basic liberty. They will also encourage
those who see in the Natural Law the only rationale for the main-
tenance of personal rights which, in a given instance, may seem to
impede what appears to be progress; those who realize that the human
person is of Divine making,, endowed with rights of Divine origin,
which cannot be invaded by any human agency, purely because of
its roots in the eternal law.
The proceedings of the Second Institute, tracing, as they did, the
development of the idea of Natural Law from Ancient Greece to our
own day, have helped immeasurably, in an understanding of the true
principles which are embodied in the Natural Law. They have shown
that the Natural Law has been grasped, at least in its rudiments, by
the eldest of civilizations as well as by our own contemporaries and
the great minds of the Middle Ages. They prove that the Natural
Law is indeed "writ in the hearts of men". It remains only for it to
be clearly written in the moving philosophy of our own Jurisprudence
and that is the aim of the Institutes. It is not too much to hope that
we shall soon see some concrete evidence of the fruition of the first
two Institutes.
NOTES
AD INISTRATIVE PROcEDURE-JuDICIAL REvIEw OF DEPORTATION
ORDERS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE AcT. Prior to the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act,1 the only avenue of appeal
from Immigration Board orders for deportation of aliens was by way of
habeas corpus proceedings. Deportation proceedings and orders for de-
portation are provided for by the Immigration Act of 1917.2 With the
1 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (1946).
2 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1946).
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advent of the Administrative Procedure Act, certain problems arose con-
cerning the availability of appeal from Immigration Board decisions
under Section 10 of the Act, which deals with judicial review of admin-
istrative agencies' decisions. The specific question involved in recent
deportation cases is whether the Administrative Procedure Act provides
another method of judicial review of Immigration Board deportation
orders. The writ of habeas corpus, of course, could not be resorted to
until the alien had been taken into custody in preparation for deporta-
tion. Thus no remedy was available to the deportee between the time
the deportation order was issued and the time he was actually taken
into custody. Does the Administrative Procedure Act provide a suitable
bridge over this period during which no remedy formerly existed?
Section 10 (c) of the Act provides:
Eveiy agency action made reviewable by statute and every
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in any court shall be subject to judicial review...
This section certainly seems to imply that the Administrative Pro-
tedure Act has supplied the necessary bridge, and that an alien placed
in such an unfortunate circumstance as heretofore mentioned, not pre-
viously having had an adequate legal remedy, may now be entitled to
judicial review under this Act. However, the question has not been
placed before the Supreme Court of the United States, and the inferior
federal courts are still in a state of indetermination.
The basic issues involved may, perhaps, be best observed in the case
of United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi.3 Trinler, the petitioner in an
action for review of an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization, had not as yet been taken into custody pur-
suant to the order. The district court dismissed his bill, but upon
appeal the circuit court of appeals reversed this decision, stating: 4
... the act did enlarge the rights of people against whom de-
portation orders have been issued and that they are now en-
titled to judicial review after the issuing of a deportation order
.. under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 he is en-
titled to have judicial review as one adversely affected by the
deportation order after its promulgation but before he has
been taken into custody.
Although the district court held that habeas corpus was an adequate
remedy for the petitioner, the circuit court took the more equitable
view that an opportunity for review should be allowed before the alien
must relinquish his American property and suffer loss of his personal
3 72 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Pa. 1947), reversed, 166 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 3rd
1948).
4 United States cx rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 3rd 1948).
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liberty. The circuit court also held that the deportation proceedings did
not fall within the first exception to Section 10 of the Act, which pro-
vides that actions expressly precluded from judicial review by statute
are exempt from said section. The basis of this ruling was the well
established practice of allowing habeas corpus proceedings by deportees
after issuance of the order by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization. Habeas corpus proceedings were considered by the ma-
jority of the court to be in the nature of judicial review. The dissenting
opinion, however, held that these proceedings did not constitute judicial
review, but rather a new suit brought to enforce an asserted civil right.
Thus the dissenting judge held that Immigration Board decisions never
had been subject to judicial review and therefore were within the ex-
ception.
Subsequently the action was abated because of petitioner's failure
to substitute the name of the new Commissioner, Miller, in place of
Carusi, who had resigned nine months earlier.5 The Solicitor General
expressed his reluctance to make the motion for abatement, as he de-
sired to appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Petitioner naturally opposed the motion which would result in the de-
struction of his asserted remedy under the Administrative Procedure
Act. It is unfortunate that a procedural technicality prevented ad-
judication of the basic issue by the Supreme Court at that time.
Subsequent developments have been promising, if not too decisive.
A district court decision made soon after the original circuit court ruling
in the Trinler case relied upon that case in holding that the Act is ap-
plicable to deportation proceedings. 6 Appeal of this case would result
in a comparatively early settlement of the question. Additional sup-
port for the view that Section 10 applies where a bill is brought for re-
view of deportation proceedings was found by the court in dicta in a
case decided earlier in the same district.7 Notwithstanding the view ex-
pressed in these two cases, a later case decided in the same district em-
bodied dicta indicating a contrary view.8
Further confirmation of the view that Section 10 is applicable is sup-
plied by analogous situations involving the reviewability of selective
5 United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 168 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 3rd 1948).
In such cases motions for substitution must be made within six months after the
resignation of the officer. This rule of procedure is based on Section 11 of the
Act of February 13, 1925, 43 STAT. 941 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 780 (1946).
6 United States ex rel. Cammarata v. Miller et al., 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N.
Y. 1948).
7 United States ex rel. Lindenau et al. v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216 (S. D. N.
Y. 1947).
8 Azzollini v. Watkins, U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y., Civil No. 47-420, October 18,
1948, 17 L. W. 2201. "In my opinion the Administrative Procedure Act has no
application to such proceedings. But, assuming that it has, the petitions fail to
allege facts showing that the petitioners are 'suffering legal wrong' because of the
proceedings." 17 L. W. 2201.
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service board orders and Immigration Board orders for exclusion of
aliens. One of the earliest cases decided with regard to-judicial review
as provided for in the Act, held that where a conscientious objector had
exhausted his administrative remedies, the mere formality of reporting
to the camp was not a part of the administrative process and that he
was entitled to review upon being prosecuted for failure to report as
ordered.0 The formality of being taken into custody in the one in-
stance is not foreign to the formality of reporting to a military camp in
the other. Formalities should be disregarded in both procedures if in-
sistence upon their observance serves no helpful purpose. In a recent
controversy before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court,
in deciding that a maritime seaman subject to an exclusion order was
entitled to judicial review, expressed the opinion that the asserted
distinction in procedure between a deportation and an exclusion case
is a "mere matter of nomenclature... of no moment in so far as con-
cerns the constitutional guarantee of due process of law". 10 It appears
from the cases considered herein that the courts may logically apply
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act without doing violence
to established rules of procedure.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act as passed by Congress
does not attempt to alleviate all of the procedural problems involved in
such a vast network of agencies as is employed by our government, it is
a great step forward towards a more simplified method of administra-
tive procedure. The express words of the Act, coupled with the legis-
lative intent, 1 would seem to justify extension of judicial review to de-
portation orders. In the absence of any substantial reason, the bene-
ficial effects of the Act should not be hamstrung by judicial reluctance
to depart from precedent.
John F. Bodle
James W. Oberfell
9 Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338, 67 S. Ct. 301, 91 L. Ed. 331 (1946).
10 Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. (2d) 239, 245 (C. C. A. 9th 1948).
11 See AD mrISxRATiv PRocmnuPE Acr-LEGisrLATiv HISTORY, SEN. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The following extracts are especially pertinent:
"Mr. McKellar. ... 'Do I correctly understand that the principal purpose of the
bill is to allow persons who are aggrieved as the result of acts of governmental
agencies to appeal to the courts?'
Mr. McCarran. 'Yes'. An~xsamTRAT= PRocEDuRE AcT-LEGsIATIvE HISTORY
supra at 318.
"Mr. Austin. 'In the event that there is no. statutory method now in effect for
review of a decision of an agency, does the distinguished author of the bill con-
template that by the language he has chosen he has given the right to the injured
party or the complaining party to a review by such extraordinary remedies as
injunction, prohibition, quo warranto, and so forth?'
Mr. McCarran. 'My answer is in the affirmative. That is true'." Aima ns-
TRATvE PRocesuax AcT-LEosLATvm HISTORY supra at 325.
NOTES
POLITICAL QUESTIONS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM JUDICIAL QUESTIONS.
-Recognizing that certain matters are beyond the effective or per-
mitted scope of the judicial function, the Supreme Court has fre-
quently refused to act in cases involving a "political question," even
where that refusal results in gross injustice, as it did in The Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,1 where the Court declined to interfere with a
threatened seizure by legislative enactment of the lands of the much-
abused Cherokee tribe. Nothwithstanding such injustice, however, the
wisdom of the Court's policy in refusing to consider such questions
cannot be doubted. It is only necessary to recall the attempt of Chief
Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case 2 to decide in a courtroom what
could only be resolved on the field of honor, to afford rather dramatic
illustration of the inability of the judicial machinery to deal with
"political questions."
The term "political question" is not, however, wholly unambiguous.
Certainly its meaning is far broader than the words themselves imply,
probably because of its use by the Supreme Court as a term of ex-
clusion, rather than as one of positive definition. Hence the common
characteristic of these so-called "political questions" seems to be
principally that they are "non-judicial," i.e. they have been considered
by the Supreme Court to be beyond the competence of the judicial
function. It is for this reason that the term political, when used in its
broader meaning, will be put in quotation marks in this note.
The problem of the "political question" concerns principally the
concept of separation of powers, both as a practical political theory,
and as an American constitutional doctrine. Thus the Supreme Court,
in considering the "political" nature of an issue before it, has regard
not only to the specific constitutional delineations between the branch-
es of government, but also the inherent competency of the judicial
function to decide that issue effectively without encroachment on the
"equal, but separate" powers of the other branches of government.
Thus, while the fundamental reason for disavowing jurisdiction has
been the limitations on the Supreme Court contained in Article III,3
the Court has seemed often impressed with practical considerations of
efficient government, as is illustrated by the following quotation: 4
In determining whether a question falls in that category,
[political questions] the appropriateness under our system
of government of attributing finality to the actions of the
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria
for judicial determination are dominant considerations.
1 5 Pet. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831).
2 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857).
3 U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
4 Coleman et al. v. Miller et al., 307 U. S. 433, 454, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed.
1385 (1939).
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This statement would hardly be complete, however, if it were not
observed that the problem of the "political question" cannot be re-
solved wholly by consideration of the principles of the separation of
powers. As has been observed: 5
... when a tribunal approaches a question, where on one horn
of the dilemma is the trained moral sentiment of the judge,
and on the other the "hypersensitive nerve of public opinion,"
it will "shy off" and throw the burden of decision on other
shoulders.
The cases in which the Supreme Court has declined jurisdiction
because of the presence of a "political" question are capable of at
least general classification. Of these classifications, perhaps none is
more important than that of foreign affairs. The attitude of the Su-
preme Court toward federal control of foreign affairs is perhaps most
succinctly stated in the following quotation: "
It results that the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to de-
clare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they
had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants
of nationality.
In regard to the treaty making power, the latitude conceded by the
Court has been great, as it is hoped will be illustrated by the follow-
ing cases. United States v. Reynes 7 involved a dispute over the title
to land purported to have been included in a tract ceded by Spain to
France and ultimately acquired by the United States. In an action
based on a later grant from Spain, the Court held the congressional
interpretation of the French-Spanish treaty as including the land in
question to be binding upon it and refused to hear the claim. For the
same reason, the Court held itself incompetent to review actions taken
in the Bering Sea pursuant to a treaty between Russia and the United
States extending the jurisdiction of both beyond the customary three-
mile limit for the purpose of regulating the seal trade. This same
principle has been held to allow the Federal Government, by treaty,
to re-examine the validity of private rights which had become vested
according to the terms of a previous treaty. Thus, the Court assumed
jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration award had been ob-
5 Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Lidtation, 37 HARv. L. Rmv. 338, 339 (1923).
6 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et aL., 299 U. S. 304, 318,
57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).
7 9 How. 127, 13 L. Ed. 74 (1850).
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tained by fraud, on the basis of statutory authority to do so pursuant
to an agreement with Mexico that these cases be reopened and ex-
amined.8
In addition, the treaty making power has been held to foreclose
judicial inquiry in the following situations:
a) The termination or continuance of a treaty. 9
b) The time when the sovereignty of a nation ceases.' 0
c) The time of the ending of a war."
d) Whether a diplomat is an accredited representative of his coun-
try.12
e) Determination of which is the de facto or de jure government of
a nation.'3
f) The time when a new nation comes into existence.'
4
It might be well to note at this point the primacy of the President
in foreign affairs, as a mere matter of separation of powers. As the
Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
et al.:15
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates.
The scope of this control does not seem to be limited, however, to
situations involving purely diplomatic relations. Presidential approval
of a CAB order refusing a request for a certificate of convenience and
necessity for an overseas airline was recently held to preclude any
judicial inquiry into the otherwise reviewable order, on the basis of
the President's control over foreign affairs.' 6
Certain questions besides those involving foreign affairs are also
held to be not justiciable because to do so would constitute an invasion
of express or properly implied powers of the other branches of govern-
8 La Albra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 12 Wheat. 599, 42 L. Ed. 223
(1899).
9 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 22 S. Ct. 484, 46 L. Ed. 534 (1901).
10 United States v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 17 L. Ed. 635 (1864).
11 United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 19 L. Ed. 615 (1870).
12 In Re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403, 10 S. Ct. 854, 34 L. Ed. 222 (1890).
'3 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691 (1890).
'4 Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L. Ed. 316 (1852). See also Clark
v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503, 67 S. Ct. 1431, 91 L. Ed. 1633 (1947); United States v.
Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942).
15 299 U. S. 304, 319, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).
16 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103,
68 S. Ct. 431 (1948).
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ment. Typical of these are questions involving amendment of the Con-
stitution such as that involved in Coleman v. Miller."7 That case in-
volved the proposed Child Labor Amendment, rejected by the Kansas
legislature in 1925, but ratified by a later resolution in 1937. In af-
firming, on certiorari, a denial of a writ of mandamus brought to pre-
vent this subsequent ratification from being communicated to Con-
gress, the Court considered only the previous practice of Congress,
stating:' 8
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legisla-
tures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted with-
drawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining
to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in
the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulga-
tion of the adoption of the amendment.
A similar attitude was taken in an early case involving, among other
things, the question whether Rhode Island had ratified the Constitu-
tion. 19 Other affirmative grants to Congress, such as the power over
land and naval forces, have been held to be beyond the purview of
the judiciary.2 0 Congressional jurisdiction over the appellate power of
the Supreme Court is a somewhat similar problem, but is, of course,
distinguishable in that it involves the bare question of the separation
of powers by the express words of the Constitution.
21
Not all the cases that are said to involve "political" questions con-
cern the division of power between the branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment, however. The Court has also declined jurisdiction in cases
where any remedy which the Court might grant would be incapable of
enforcement without infringement on the political aspects of state gov-
ernment. Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall stated in deciding, on other
grounds, the previously mentioned case of The Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia: 
22
The bill requires us to control the Legislature of Georgia,
and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The pro-
priety of such an interposition by the court may be well
questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political
power to be within the proper province of the judicial de-
partment.
17 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1938).
18 307 U. S. 433, 450, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1938).
-9 Luther v. Borden et al., 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849).
20 Quackenbush v. United States, 177 U. S. 20, 20 S.Ct. 530, 44 L.Ed. 654
(1900).
21 Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869).
22 5 Pet. 1, 20, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831).
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It must be remembered, however, that however controlling is the argu-
ment that such action would be outside the scope of the judicial func-
tion, it cannot be doubted that the practical difficulties involved in en-
forcing such a decree have also been of great force. It was at least par-
tially because of this latter consideration that the Court was led to
deny equitable relief to a Negro seeking an order requiring his regis-
tration as a qualified voter.28 Failure to meet other fundamental re-
quirements for the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has also at times
given the Court reason to decline jurisdiction in cases involving a
"political" question. Thus in Clough v. Curtis,2 the Court refused to
determine whether a legislative body had been validly constituted on
the ground that a determination of the point was not necessary to a
settlement of any valid controversy between private parties before it.
The constitutional guarantee of a "Republican Form of Govern-
ment" 25 has been held to be one not supported by judicial remedy,
since to afford judicial relief would require an invasion of the political
sphere.26 For this reason, the Supreme Court has refused to consider
the proposition that laws passed by means of the "initiative" system
are unconstitutional because enacted through a system of pure de-
mocracy.27 The Court has also considered the question of the separa-
tion of powers between the branches of state governments to be at
least outside the province of the Supreme Court, if not beyond the
purview of the Federal Government altogether.28 The recent case of
Colegrove et al. v. Green et al.,2 9 in which the Court held itself to be
without jurisdiction to affect Illinois' grossly unfair system of voting
districts, presents an interesting aspect of the situation considered
here. While holding, of course, that the Court could not assume the
task of redistricting Illinois to secure a more equitable apportionment,
the majority was also of the view that the Court was incompetent to
invalidate the apportionment system, since to do so would infringe
upon the exclusive power of Congress and the states to control the
23 Giles v. Harris et al., 189 U. S. 475, 23 S. Ct. 639, 47 L. Ed. 909 (1903).
An action at law is, however, provided by statute. Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875),
8 U. S. C. 43 (1946). See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 208, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed.
1281 (1939).
24 134 U. S. 361, 10 S. Ct. 573, 33 L. Ed. 945 (1890).
25 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4.
26 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61
L.Ed. 685 (1917); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223
U. S. 118, 32 S. Ct. 224, 56 L. Ed. 377 (1912); Luther v. Borden et al., 7 How.
1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849).
27 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32
S. Ct. 224, 56 L. Ed. 377 (1912).
28 Highland Farm Dairy, Inc., et al. v. Agnew et al., 300 U. S. 608, 57 S.Ct.
549, 81 L. Ed. 835 (1937).
29 328 U. S. 549, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946).
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election of congressmen.30 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in de-
livering the opinion of the Court: 3 '
The Constitution has left the performance of many duties
in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the
executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the
vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights.
The extent to which the guarantees of the Constitution were in-
tended to be protected only by "the vigilance of the people" may well
be questioned. As Mr. Justice Black stated in dissenting: 32
• .. it is a mere "play on words" to refer to a controversy
such as this as "political" in the sense that courts have noth-
ing to do with protecting and vindicating the right of a
voter to cast an effective ballot.
One glance at the varied and dissimilar classifications of the cases
in which the Supreme Court has declined jurisdiction because of the
presence of a "political" question seems sufficient to prove the in-
ability of the term itself to imply all its applications. It is, as has been
stated previously, a residual term, comprehensible only in terms of the
particular facts which give rise to its application. It is not for that
reason, however, any less efficient in performing its laudable purpose
of restricting the judiciary to its proper scope. Its usually prudent use
in the past has done much to increase the dignity and effectiveness of
the American judiciary. It is only hoped that its use in the future will
not result in judicial abnegation of the duty to provide judicial remedy
for governmental invasions of private political rights.
John I. Cauley.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION-JEOPARDIZING THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUsTIcE.-Judicial power to punish summarily contempts
committed outside the physical presence of the court has been much
disputed, not only because of its questionable historical origin, but also
because, both in theory and in practice, it seems alien to American
concepts of liberty. Although it is well settled that the claim that this
power existed from "time immemorial" rests upon an unfounded assump-
tion of Blackstone' derived from an undelivered opinion of Wilmot in
30 U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 4.
31 Colegrov' et al. v. Green et al., 328 U. S. 549, 556, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 90
L.Ed. 1432 (1946).
32 Id. at 573.
1 4 BL. Comm. 152.
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King v. Almon,2 it cannot be disputed that the frequent exercise of this
power, both in America and in England, has made it an historical real-
ity.3 That the exercise of this power has not been undisputed, however,
is evidenced by the large volume of legislation which has attempted,
generally without success, to regulate or abolish it.
The principal objection to the exercise of the power in punishing
contemptuous publications is, of course, that it is open to grave abuse
since it provides an unscrupulous judge with a summary method of deal-
ing with those who have offended him by their critical writings. While
it is not denied that the power to punish summarily for contempt is
vital when the contempt is direct, i. e.,consisting of acts done within the
physical presence of the court so as to disturb the administration of jus-
tice, it is seriously contended by many that this power either should not
extend to critical or libelous writings concerning the administration of
justice, or the contemnor should be insured a jury trial, as in criminal
cases. While recent United States Supreme Court cases have robbed this
controversy of some of its force, the law of indirect contempt by publi-
cation has by no means been interred.
The liability for the publication of contemptuous writings is almost
absolute. Truth is no defense,4 but an absence of intent to offend the
dignity of the court can be shown where the publication is contemptuous
only by innuendo.3 Where, however, in the opinion of the court, there
is no doubt as to the meaning, a contemnor cannot purge himself of
the contempt by affirming his good intentions.6 While it is generally
held that the publication must relate to the merits of a pending case,
7
it need not -relate to it specifically by name.8 In a much-quoted case
in New Hampshire, an attorney was held guilty of contempt for the
publication of an article concerning a pending case where he did not
know the case was pending and where he had not intended to influence
the court.9 In Indiana, a publisher was held liable for a contemptuous
article published without his knowledge on the basis of his duty to avoid
printing contemptuous matter.' 0
2 Wilm. 243, 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (K. B. 1765). See Nelles and King, Contempt
by Publication in the United States Before the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COL.
L. REv. 401 (1928), outlining the work of Sir John C. Fox. Fox, TE HISTORY
oF CONTN:I T Or COURT (1927).
8 "... . the conclusion as to the nature of the power to punish for contempt
dearly declared and frequently reiterated is not to be regarded as overthrown by
reason of a possible misapprehension of the law of England with respect to the
exercise of this power." In re Opinions of the Justices, 314 Mass. 767, 49 N. E.
(2d) 252, 259 (1943).
4 Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926).
5 Fishback v. State, 131 Ind. 304, 30 N. E. 1088 (1892).
6 Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926).
7 Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301, 11 N. E. 426 (1887).
8 Ez parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 At. 312 (1927).
9 In the Matter of Sturoc, 48 N. H. 428 (1869).
10 Kilgallen v. State, 192 Ind. 531, 132 N. E. 682, 137 N. E. 178 (1922).
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The gist of contempt is the interference with the administration of
justice, and thus it is almost 11 universally held that if the publication
refers to cases no longer pending, no statement, no matter how libelous,
can constitute contempt by publication. The courts have not been con-
sistent, however, in determining at what point a case is to be considered
no longer pending. There is a division of opinion as to whether a case
may be considered ended after the verdict has been rendered, but be-
fore the time to file for retrial or rehearing has elapsed. 12 It has been
held,. however, that the fact that an appeal has been taken does not
make a publication about the lower court's decision contemptuous. 13
Comments on the conduct of a receiver have been held contemptuous
where the acts and reports of such receiver awaited approval by the
court,14 but a contrary result was reached in Indiana on similar facts. 1
The United States Supreme Court has refused to consider it a constitu-
tional issue in itself, regarding it as a question ". . . which local law can
settle as it pleases without interference from the Constitution of the
United States." 36
A determination of pendency is, however, but a preliminary. It is
ultimately but one factor to be considered in determining whether the
11 In America, contempt convictions for "scandalizing the court", i. e. de-
grading the court or embarrassing its members, have long been recognized as in-
consistent with constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press, Ex
parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130 (N. D. Ala. 1903), and are even obsolete in England.
McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) A. C. 549.
There are cases reasoning that a derogatory article, even though directed only
at a decided case, tends to influence the disposition of all future cases, at least of
all those of the same type. While the logic of this position is unassailable, most
courts have felt this danger too remote to warrant the suspension of civil liberties.
The position of the United States Supreme Court as regards the constitutional
questions involved have made these decisions of little practical value. Shumaker et
al. v. State, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N. E. 769, 162 N. E. 441, 163 N. E. 272 (1927);
Boorde v. Comm., 134 Va. 625, 114 S. E. 731 (1922). Contra: State ex rel. Pul.
Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1239, 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (1941) (another case
then pending).
12 In re Nelson, 103 Mont. 43, 60 P. (2d) 365 (1936); State v. Tugwell, 19
Wash. 238, 52 Pac. 1056 (1898) ; Bates v. State, 210 Ark. 652, 197 S. W (2d) 45
(1946) (dictum). That such a case is not pending: Metzler v. Gounod, 30 L. T.
N. S. 264 (1874). See Fishback v. State, 131 Ind. 304, 30 N. E. 1088 (1892);
State ex rel. Haskell v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 285 (1895) (remittitur).
Is Re Dalton, 46 Kan. 253, 26 Pac. 673 (1891); Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa
245 (1858).
14 United States v. Craig, 266 Fed. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), 279 Fed. 900
(S. D. N. Y. 1921), habeas corpus granted, Ex parte Craig, 274 Fed. 177 (C. C. A.
2d 1921), rev'd, 282 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d 1921), cert. denied, Craig v. McCarthy,
258 U. S. 617, 42 S. Ct. 272, 66 L. Ed. 793 (1922), cert. granted, Craig v. Hecht,
260 U. S. 714, 43 S. Ct. 90, 67 L. Ed. 477 (1922), 263 U. S. 255, 44 S. Ct. 103,
68 L. Ed. 293 (1923); Bloom v. People, 23 Colo. 416, 48 Pac. 519 (1897).
15 Nixon v. State, 207 id. 426, 193 N. E. 591 (1935).
16 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 459, 460, 27 S. Ct. 556, 51 L. Ed. 879
(1907).
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particular publication presents a danger to the administration of justice
of sufficient gravity to justify a suspension of civil liberties. This prob-
lem transcends the law of contempt; it is a matter of great constitu-
tional importance about which the Supreme Court has not been silent.
The present view of the Supreme Court toward convictions in state
courts for comments about litigation then pending is perhaps best ex-
pressed in the following words of Mr. Justice Douglas in delivering the
opinion of the court in Craig v. Harney:17
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the meas-
ure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it
kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat
to the administration of justice. The danger must not be re-
mote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.
The "clear and present danger" rule defies exact definition. Since Mr.
Justice Holmes first coined the phrase in Schenck v. United- States,18
upholding a conviction under the Federal Espionage Act 19 for discour-
aging enlistment in the Army, it has had varied uses, among the more
recent being its application to the law of contempt in Bridges v. Cali-
fornia.20 Previous to the Bridges case, the Court had held that state
contempt convictions were not to be disturbed where the publication in
question had a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct the administration of
justice.
21
In the two decisions subsequent to the Bridges case, the Court has
pointed out the fact that the phrase is not to be taken too literally. As
Mr. Justice Reed stated in Pennekamp v. Florida:22
Whether the threat to the impartial and orderly administra-
tion of justice must be a dear and present or a grave and im-
mediate danger, a real and substantial threat, one which is close
and direct, or one which disturbs the court's sense of fairness,
depends upon a choice of words.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, writes: 23
"Clear and present danger" was never used by Mr. Justice
Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a
formula for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to
be distorted by being taken from its context.
17 331 U. S. 367, 376, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546 (1947).
18 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
19 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 31 (1946).
20 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941).
2-1 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62
L. Ed. 1186 (1918).
22 328 U. S. 331, 336. 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946).
28 Id. at 353.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Thus it appears that the present Supreme Court considers the "clear
and present danger" rule merely a convenient phrase to adorn a de-
cision in reality grounded on what is termed, "a balance between the
desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free
from interruption of its processes." 24 The Supreme Court has not been
too informative as regards the nature of this balance, other than to state
that judges must be "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy cli-
mate." 25
As was mentioned previously, there have been many attempts to re-
strict the power of the judiciary to punish indirect contempts by re-
quiring a jury trial, or by abolishing the power altogether, but these
attempts have been largely unsuccessful. With exceptions, state courts
have generally 26 frustrated legislative attempts to curb their contempt
power either by declaring such statutes unconstitutional, or by constru-
ing them to be merely "declaratory" 27 of some of the contempt powers.
The federal situation is equally interesting. In Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. United States,28 the Supreme Court departed from its previous
interpretation 2 9 of the Contempt Act of 1831 30 and ruled that the
phrase, ". . . in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the ad-
ministration of justice . . .", purporting to limit the power of the lower
federal courts to punish for contempt to those cases arising within the
physical presence of the court, actually had a causal, and not a geogra-
phical meaning, and thus extended the power of the federal courts to
24 Id. at 336.
25 Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 376, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546 (1947).
An interesting example of what "fortitude" might require is found in the reasoning
in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S.' Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941), to the
effect that editorials in the Los Angeles Times concededly attempting to influence
a judge in his decision in a pending case did not present a "clear and present
danger" since a judge in that area would know the stand the Los Angeles Times
would take in the matter and thus the editorials had no more effect than would
the expectation of such an outburst after the case had been decided.
26 The following are at least some of the states which allow legislative restric-
tion of the contempt power: Kentucky: Ky. RaV. STAT. § 432.240 (Baldwin, 1943)
upheld in Talbott v. Comm., 207 Ky. 749, 270 S. W. 32 (1925). New York: J'Uv.
LAW §§ 750 et seq. PEN. LAW § 600, upheld in Rutherford v. Holmes, 5 Hun 317
(1875), aff'd 66 N. Y. 368 (1876) (court created by statute); see Peo. ex rel.
Webster v. Van Tassel, 64 Hun 444, 19 N. Y. S. 643 (1892). Pennsylvania: PENwN.
STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 2041 (Purdon), Appeal of Marks, 144 Pa. Super. 556, 20 A.
(2d) 242 (1941).
A complete discussion of this point may be found in Nelles and King, Contempt
by Publication in the United States Since the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 CoL.
L. REv. 525 (1928).
27 Jones v. State, 39 Ga. App. 1, 145 S. E. 914 (1928); see Hale v. State,
55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199 (1896).
28 247 U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918).
29 Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L. Ed. 205 (1874).
30 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 385 (1946).
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cases of indirect contempt. This interpretation was greatly criticized,
principally because the legislative history of the Act shows clearly that
it was intended to prevent the sort of summary punishment for con-
tempt by publication that led to the celebrated trial of Judge Peck.31
In 1941, this holding was overruled in Nye v. United States,32 the Court
returning to the view that the lower federal courts may only punish
for contempts committed within the physical presence of the court.
Where the court is constitutional in origin, the argument against the
constitutionality of such legislation seems strong. Assuming that the
power to punish for indirect contempt is implied in the power to ex-
ercise judicial functions, it follows that the constitution which creates
the court, without limitation, must necessarily imply that that court is to
have "inherent" contempt power. Legislative action limiting the power
to punish for contempt would then be attempting to deny a power
which that constitution had granted. Where, however, the court in
question is statutory in origin, a question arises to perplex those who
call the contempt power inherent. Does this contempt power inhere in
a court because of it existence, or because it exercises judicial power?
Where a court has been created by statute, it would seem to follow that
a statute could alter its nature, and thus its "inherent power" would
appear to depend on a fair construction of the statute. Certainly a clear
prohibition would defeat any implication that a grant of that contempt
power was intended.
If, however, the contempt power inheres in a court because of its
very existence as a part of the judicial branch of the government, such
legislative prohibitions would be fruitless for the reasons which are
perhaps most strongly expressed in the following quotation: 3s
The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot
abridge, the express or necessarily implied powers granted to
this court by the Constitution. If it could, it might encroach
upon both the judicial and executive departments and draw to
itself all the powers of government, and thereby destroy the ad-
mirable system of checks and balances to be found in the or-
ganic framework of both the Federal and state constitu-
tions...
If the power to punish for indirect contempt is such an indispensable
aspect of the judicial function as to require the protection of the prin-
31 Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States Before the
Federal Contempt Statute, 28 CoL. L. REv. 401 (1928).
32 313 U. S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172 (1941).
33 State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1885). For an argument that such legisla-
tion does not violate the "separation of powers" principle, see Frankfurter and
Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"
Federal Courts- A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAav. L. RPv. 1010 (1923).
